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FINANCING GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM. By George F. 
Break. Washington, D.C.: Brookings. 1980. Pp. xi, 276. Cloth, 
$17.95; paper, $6.95. 
When the Brookings Institution published George F. Break's 
well-received book, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United 
States, 1 the nation's unemployment rate was 3.9 percent,2 the infla-
tion rate was 2.9 percent, 3 and Proposition 13 was eleven years from 
becoming a household word. Dramatic changes in the economy and 
in public opinion have produced governmental finance structures 
and problems that differ markedly from those outlined by Break in 
1967. Although Financing Government in a Federal System follows 
the format of his earlier effort, it is much more than simply a revised 
edition.4 Instead, the book systematically reassesses intergovern-
mental fiscal relations and "the principles and tradeoffs" that have 
determined their evolution (p. viii). 
Break's fresh look is an excellent single-volume guide to in-
tergovernmental finance in the United States that is accessible to 
lawyers who have a basic understanding of economics but find much 
of the current literature too quantitative. Break develops little new 
theory, but he does present the major issues and reform proposals 
concisely and impartially. He begins this presentation by explaining 
a number of recent trends in governmental output, expenditures, and 
revenues. The discussion highlights a shift in the relative importance 
of various types of state and local taxes, an increase in federal aid to 
state and local governments, particularly to the largest cities, and a 
narrowing of regional disparities in the ratio of federal taxes paid to 
grants received.5 The remainder of the book deals with three major 
I. G. BREAK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1967). 
See Crouch, Book Review, 373 AM. ACAD. POL & Sc1. ANNALS 278 (1967); Oates, Book Re-
view, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 956 (1967); Wright, Book Review, 61 AM. POL & Sci. REV. 1135 
(1967). 
2. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1979 at 
392 (1979). 
3. Id. at 476. 
4. Over three quarters of Break's references are to sources published after 1967. In fact, 
one has to look carefully to find even paraphrases of sentences from his earlier book. 
5. Those living in the frostbelt apparently have a legitimate claim when they object to the 
heavier spending offederal monies in the sunbelt. The 1974-1976 federal expenditure-to-reve-
nue ratio for the Great Lakes region was only .75, while the Southeast and Far West region 
had expenditure-to-revenue ratios of 1.11 and 1.13. These regional disparities are nevertheless 
far below those of the 1950s and 1960s. Pp. 28-29. 
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areas of public finance - tax coordination, intergovernmental 
grants, and urban finance. 
Although his analysis is primarily economic, Break remains sen-
sitive to the political realities that confront fiscal reformers. For ex-
ample, he advocates that states tax interstate businesses according to 
a uniform apportionment formula based on "[s]ome physical pres-
ence in the state, measured by property and payroll" (p. 72). But 
Break realizes that political, as well as legal constraints limit the po-
tential for reform in this area, and he acknowledges that states may 
insist on including a sales factor that strays from the ideal theoretical 
solution. Break's skill at measuring the practicality of reform pro-
posals is also apparent in his discussion of intergovernmental grants. 
For example, Break's analysis reveals that many federal matching 
funds are fungible and that competitive grants, designed to eliminate 
existing inefficiencies, can create new ones by increasing complexity 
and administrative costs. In some cases, however, that complexity 
may itself be advantageous. Break argues that the complexity of the 
revenue sharing distribution formula "frustrates attempts by individ-
ual recipient jurisdictions to improve their own entitlement qualifi-
cations ... and take advantage of its loopholes" (p. 152). 
In the book's final chapter Break studies the acute fiscal needs of 
urban areas and their increasing dependence on outside sources of 
income. In 1977, intergovernmental aid to the largest cities 
amounted to nearly seventy-five percent of own-source revenue, 
compared with less than thirty percent in 1962 (p. 225). Rather than 
advocate metropolitan governments and fiscal units as he did in the 
parallel chapter of his earlier book, Break now focuses on existing 
fiscal problems. He is particularly troubled by the dilemma of cities 
that must increase taxes to compensate for continually eroding tax 
bases despite public pressure to cut taxes and government spending. 
The traditional benefits-received and ability-to-pay models, which 
Break calls "beautifully appealing theories in search of a pragmatic 
solution," cannot resolve this dilemma. In their place, he proposes 
"a restraining-rules-and-process model" that resembles a "set of ad 
hoc and unintegrated solutions" designed to keep government 
spending within the constraints of public opinion (p. 226). 
The "restraining-rules-and-process model" assumes that bureau-
cratic and political processes will not achieve economic efficiency 
and consumer satisfaction and that "improvement in the process by 
which public choices are made is a vain hope" (p. 258). Rather than 
rely on these processes, Break proposes "change[s] in the power rela-
tions prevailing in the government sector" (p. 258). Effective reform 
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may require shifting some of the discretionary power of politicians 
and bureaucrats to the taxpayers. Controls on spending and taxation 
may produce the desired shift, but questions concerning the effect of 
such restraints on the quality of life remain. The ultimate question is 
whether to make a drastic change, as in California, or to move grad-
ually by way of restraining rules and processes. Because the answer 
will vary with diverse local conditions, Break can offer no definite 
resolution of this question. 
Despite the depressing statistics that he cites, Break communi-
cates the optimism of one who believes that experimentation will be 
rewarded. As he observes, "One of the great strengths of the U.S. 
federal system is that it affords vast space for laying out avenues to 
fiscal reform and ample opportunities for comparing the efficacy of 
their design" (p. 266). Break's coherent analysis of current fiscal 
problems and reform proposals should facilitate such productive ex-
perimentation. 
